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Abstract 
 
This article investigates the link between the Roman notion of fides and the contemporary 
notion of fiduciary duties. Etymologically, the word “fiduciary” derives from fides. The 
Roman fides was very complex concept, blending religious, social, and legal valences. The 
religious and social fides entered Roman law in a substantive form, as bona fides, and as a 
standard of judgment, in the form of bonus vir. It is submitted that a close analogy can be 
drawn between bonus vir and the contemporary fiduciary standards. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Trust and confidence are essential elements in many social and legal relations. In law, the 
trust and confidence that one person reposes in another are often regarded as the hallmarks of 
a special category of legal relations, called fiduciary relations. Examples of fiduciary relations 
include trustee-beneficiary, agent-principal, director-corporation, doctor-patient, parent-child 
or state-aboriginal nations.1 It is generally understood that the family of fiduciary relations is 
open, and courts apply this label in new contexts based on relevant indications, such as 
unilateral power, trust and confidence or vulnerability. The consequences of labelling a legal 
relation as fiduciary are quite severe: the person holding discretionary power and in whom 
trust and confidence are placed is bound by strict fiduciary duties, imposing high standards of 
unselfishness and fidelity. Such persons must avoid actual or potential conflicts of interest, 
must disgorge unauthorised benefits even if not pursued in bad faith or at the other party’s 
expense, and must exercise their decision-making power based on relevant considerations 
only.2   
Over the past decades, the family of fiduciary relations has expanded significantly into 
various areas of private and public law. The growth of the fiduciary family has often been 
unprincipled, based on loose analogies with established fiduciary categories. Consequently, 
fiduciary relations and fiduciary duties are considered among the most ill-defined and 
misleading legal concepts.3 At times, the search for an essential, common denominator of the 
fiduciary relations turns to exploring the literal meaning of the word “fiduciary.”4  This line of 
inquiry points to the word fides and its role in Roman law. Looking to Roman law for the 
essence of fiduciary relations and duties is, at first sight, a promising endeavour. Many of the 
quintessential fiduciary institutions recognized in contemporary law, such as the trust, the 
mandate, the partnership, or the guardianship were recognized in Roman law as relations 
governed by bona fides. The historical investigation, thus, faces the additional task of 
elucidating the relations between fides and bona fides within the social and legal context in 
which these concepts developed. At a closer look, however, fides reveals itself as a concept of 
tremendous complexity. The present article traces the evolution of fides throughout the 
historical stages of Rome in Antiquity. It underlines how the emphasis in this multi-faceted 
concept shifted from its religious charge to its social nature, and finally to its legal 
consequences.  
Semantically, one of the core meanings of fides was confidence, both in an active sense of 
reposing confidence in another and in the passive sense of creditworthiness that one enjoys in 
others’ view.5 Fides, was thus associated with relations of inequality, where a subordinate and 
vulnerable party reposed confidence in a powerful and dominant party. These relations of 
inequality based on fides were regulated by multiple normative systems that co-existed in 
Rome. At the dawn of Roman civilization, when the mighty pontiffs administered the 
religious and the secular law, breach of fides was regarded as a violation of the divine law 
                                                 
1 See Remus Valsan, “Understanding Fiduciary Duties: Conflict of Interest and Proper Exercise of Judgment in 
Private Law”, McGill University Doctoral Dissertation (2012) 16, available online at 
www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/thesescanada/index-e.html. 
2 Ibid. at 35. 
3 Paul D. Finn, Fiduciary Obligations (1977), 1. 
4 In R. v. Neil, for instance, Justice Binnie of the Supreme Court of Canada tried to identify the content of a 
lawyer’s fiduciary duty using a terminological analysis of “fiduciary:” “The duty of loyalty is intertwined with 
the fiduciary nature of the lawyer-client relationship. One of the roots of the word fiduciary is fides, or loyalty, 
and loyalty is often cited as one of the defining characteristics of a fiduciary.” (R. v. Neil [2002] 3 S.C.R. 631 at 
643). See also Peter Birks, “The Content of Fiduciary Obligation”, 34 Israel Law Review (2000) 3, 8.  
5 See section 3 below. 
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(fas), and exposed the offender to divine punishment. Such breach of fides, however, rarely 
gave rise to a cause of action under the secular law (ius), during this time. In the last decade of 
the 6th century BCE, when Rome passed from Monarchy to Republic, the religious and civil 
jurisdictions became separate, and the pontiffs lost a great part of their extensive judicial 
powers. During this transition, many instances of breach of fides that had been punished under 
divine law, but that were not recognized under secular law, were taken over by the emerging 
magistracy of censorship. Charged with the preservation of the ancestral customs and values, 
the censors punished offenses against fides with the quasi-legal penalty of ignominy 
(ignominia), which placed a stigma on the individual and deprived him of his good social 
status. From around the middle of the 3rd century BCE, the peregrine praetor rendered the 
breach of fides in certain core social relations actionable under the law applicable to relations 
between Romans and foreigners (ius gentium, “the law of the peoples”). Almost two centuries 
later, the urban praetor included the core relations founded on fides under the protection of the 
law applying between Roman citizens (ius civile, “the civil law”), which granted these 
relations full legal recognition. At the same time, bona fides took on a life of its own and 
emerged as a distinct concept.    
Although fides was a fundamental concept of the quotidian religious and social life of Rome, 
its role as a legal concept was less momentous. This was not the case, however, for bona 
fides, its main offspring, which became one of the most important concepts in the legal 
traditions influenced by Roman law. Fides as confidence reposed and trustworthiness enjoyed 
remained confined to rules of limited applicability and particular legal institutions. Although 
duties of loyalty and care inspired by the pre-legal fides were consecrated in legal institutions 
such as guardianship (tutela), fideicomissary obligation (fideicommissum), fiduciary 
agreement (fiducia), partnership (societas), or mandate (mandatum), the religious, social, and 
moral fides never crossed into the legal sphere as a core concept of an abstract fiduciary 
office. Although not an essential part of the positive law, fides continued to act as a powerful 
catalyst and deterrent of behavior, and enjoyed implicit recognition by law as a socially 
binding standard. Fides also played a central role as a benchmark of judicial decision making 
in the form of the bonus vir standard (the judgment of an archetypal upright man). The bonus 
vir standard of decision making, it is submitted, is the concept that unites the Roman fides 
with the contemporary theory of fiduciary duties. Bonus vir has been invoked in the 18th and 
the 19th centuries as the standard that persons holding fiduciary powers should use to guide 
their exercise of discretion. 
The remaining part of this article is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces fides as an 
omnipresent notion in Roman life. Section 3 is an in-depth etymological and semantic 
analysis of fides. Section 4 traces the meaning of this concept under the divine law and social 
customs, with particular focus on the relations of patronage (clientela) and friendship 
(amicitia). Section 5 explores the substantive and procedural roles of fides in the secular law. 
Section 6 links the bonus vir standard of exercise of discretion with the current theory of 
fiduciary duties. Section 7 concludes.    
 
  
2. The Romans, people of fides 
 
Romans considered themselves a people of fides. The Greek historian of the 1st century BCE, 
Diodorus Siculus, reported that the Romans had the habit of persistently talking about fides.6 
                                                 
6 “[T]he Romans, harping as they did on the word fides, certainly ought not to protect assassins who had shown 
the greatest contempt for good faith.” Diodorus Siculus, The Library of History, Books 21-32, trans. by Francis 
R. Walton (1957), 83-84. 
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For Cicero fides was the foundation of justice7 and the holiest thing in life,8 and for Valerius 
Maximus it represented security for all human happiness.9 
The relations of fides were numerous and complex among the Romans. Fides represented the 
cornerstone of friendship (amicitia) and patronage (clientela), the high creditworthiness 
associated with nobility, the ultimate form of surety and godly protection. The Romans also 
applied fides to many aspects of their international relations. Good faith in war (fides in bello) 
required Roman combatants to demonstrate fair play and chivalry toward their adversaries. In 
case of negotiations with the enemy, good faith in negotiations (fides in colloquio) required 
the belligerents to respect scrupulously the integrity of the delegates from the other side. 
When a foreign community surrendered itself unconditionally, the concept of surrender to 
Rome’s faith (deditio in fidem) prohibited the Romans to massacre or enslave the conquered 
peoples.10 At the intra-community level, the relations of confidence between citizens (fides 
quiritium) imposed a general duty of protection among them and a duty of loyalty to the 
interests of Romans as a whole (res publica). The fidelity of the troops (fides militium) 
required soldiers to protect their comrades and to obey loyally the superiors’ orders. The duty 
to protect the citizens and the state (fides senatus) demanded the senators’ loyalty to their 
public commitments and fairness in debates and decision making.11 For magistrates, judges, 
and witnesses, fides imposed specific duties that ensured a fair trial and the preservation of the 
public confidence in the judicial system.12      
So vital was fides for the Romans, that they deified it. As it was the case with other human 
qualities, such as courage (virtus), justice (iustitia), dutifulness (pietas), decency (pudor), and 
chastity (pudicitia), the Romans elevated the virtue of fides to the rank of goddess.13 The 
veneration of Fides goes back to the earliest antiquity. According to Varro, the Romans 
adopted her from the Sabins, an ancient nation from central Italy.14 Dionysius of 
Halicarnassus, Titus Livius, and Plutarch credited Rome’s second king, Numa Pompilius 
(715-672 BCE) with the introduction of the cult of Fides.15 But this divinity is not firmly 
attested in Rome until the middle of the 3rd century BCE, when Atilius Calatinus built a 
temple of Fides on the Capitol. Besides being used for occasional meetings of the Senate, the 
temple was the guarantor of the observance of duties imposed by international treaties.16 The 
primary role of Fides was to protect honesty and fidelity in the execution of obligations. She 
watched over the agreements concluded by joining of the right hands (dextrarum iunctio), 
protected those who acted loyally, rewarded those who worshiped her by granting them social 
credit, and punished heresy by loss of good standing.17  
                                                 
7 Cicero, On Duties 1.7.23, in John Higginbotham (trans.), On Moral Obligation: A New Translation of Cicero’s 
De officiis (1967), 46.  
8 Cicero, Against Verres, 2.3.3 in Charles D. Yonge (trans.), The Orations of Marcus Tullius Cicero, vol. 1 
(1878), 297.   
9 See Fritz Schulz, Principles of Roman Law, trans. by Marguerite Wolff (1936), 224.  
10 Barry Jolowicz and Herbert F. Nicholas, Historical Introduction to the Study of Roman Law (1972), 65, n. 3. 
11 Gérard Freyburger, Fides – Étude sémantique et religieuse depuis les origines jusqu’à l’époque augustéenne 
(1986), 103-132. 
12 See generally Freyburger, supra note 11 at 99-228. 
13 Cicero, On the Commonwealth and On the Laws, ed. by James E.G. Zetzel (1999), 140. 
14 Marcus Terentius Varro, On the Latin Language, trans. by Roland G. Kent, vol. 1 (1977), 64-71. 
15 Dionysius 2.74-75 in Earnest Cary (trans.), The Roman Antiquities of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, vol. 1 
(1937), 535-539; Livy, The History of Rome: Books I-IV, trans. by Aubrey De Selincourt (2002), 54-55; 
Plutarch, The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans, trans. by John Dryden (1978), 363-365. 
16 William R. Nifong, “Promises Past: Marcus Atilius Regulus and the Dialogue of Natural Law”, 49 Duke Law 
Journal (2000) 1092, 1095; Marcel Le Glay, “La dexiosis dans les mystères de Mithra” in J. Duchesne-
Guillemin (ed.), Études Mithriaques: Actes du 21 Congres International, Téhéran, (Acta Iranica 17), vol. 4 
(1978) 279, 291-292. 
17 Freyburger, supra note 11 at 248. 
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As Dumézil pointed out, the cult of Fides had little in common with the contemporary idea of 
religious devotion. Numa, the Roman king credited with the establishment of the cult of the 
goddess Fides, enjoyed the reputation of a skilled negotiator with the gods. His religious 
convictions were based not so much on piety as on the belief that the gods will be loyal to 
their promises. Therefore, the acts of worship of Fides, notably the offering, resembled more 
the acts of commerce, of exchange between deities and humans, than acts of piety.18  
Although a deified virtue, fides retained a pragmatic role. Offerings to Fides had little, if any, 
devotional charge. They were perceived as a sort of exchange with an almighty partner whose 
divine status offered the best assurance for reciprocation. At the level of relations between 
mortals, fides, the symbolic goddess located in the mind of every virtuous Roman, ensured 
that voluntary promises and the duties associated with a certain status or role (officia), would 
be observed, under pain of religious and social stigmatization.  
The geographic, economic, and cultural growth of the Roman state and the diversification of 
exchanges with neighbouring nations multiplied the valences and roles of fides. The religious 
component, however, was carried forward, to variable extents, in all manifestations of fides. 
As Cicero warned, if the reverence toward the gods was to be abolished, fides among 
individuals would disappear shortly afterwards.19   
 
 
3. Etymologic roots and semantic evolution of fides 
 
The complexity, versatility, and omnipresence of fides in Roman life render this Roman value 
almost impossible to be grasped fully by modern researchers. The noun fides was the object of 
numerous studies by linguists, historians, and jurists, but owing to its complex nature and to 
the scarcity of original materials, little agreement has been reached about its exact semantic 
range. As Lemosse cautioned, any attempt to find a comprehensive and homogenous 
definition of fides is destined to fail.20  
Of Indo-European roots, fides evolved with the Roman society to become a fundamental 
social, religious, and later, legal concept. The noun fides derives from the adjective fidus 
meaning trustworthy, reliable. Fidus, in its turn, derives from the Indo-European root 
*bheidh-, meaning to trust, to confide. From a strict etymological point of view, the noun 
fides meant confidence that one inspires in others.21 The etymological studies of fides suggest 
that, originally, this notion referred to relations of inequality, in which the party with a lower 
standing reposed confidence in another, of higher rank, with the expectation or certitude of 
receiving a benefit in return.  
The exact original meaning and semantic range of fides remain disputed. According to one 
current of thought, fides was originally a religious word, designating good standing in a 
divinity’s eyes maintained by purity and truthfulness, and the general idea of a divine 
supervision of contracts between humans.22 According to another current of thought, fides 
                                                 
18 Georges Dumézil, Idées romaines (1969), 56-59; Georges Dumézil, Mitra-Varuna: Essai sur deux 
représentations indo-européennes de la souveraineté (2d ed., 1948), 71-75. 
19 Charles D. Yonge (trans.), Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations: Also Treatises On the Nature of the Gods, and On 
the Commonwealth (1877), 210. 
20 Maxime Lemosse, “L’aspect primitif de la fides” in Maxime Lemosse, Études Romanistiques (1991), 62. 
21 Georges Dumezil, Idees Romaines, supra note 18; Freyburger, supra note 11 at 29-31. According to Meillet, 
fides also acted as noun for the verb credo, thus driving out of the Latin vocabulary the ancient noun credes 
(Antoine Meillet, “Latin credo et fides” 22 Mémoiresde la Société de Linguistique de Paris (1920), 215-218).  
22 See Burkard W. Leist, Alt-Arisches Jus Civile, vol. 1 (1892), trans. by Albert Kocourek, in Albert Kocourek 
and John W. Wigmore,  Primitive and Ancient Legal Institutions (1915), 481-498; Jean Bayet, Histoire politique 
et psychologique de la religion romaine (2nd ed.,1969), 141.  
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originated as a profane word, and although fides and its verb form crēdō were associated with 
religion in pre-Christian Rome, their religious connotations, in the sense we ascribe today to 
the word “religious,” came about only with the rise of Christianity.23 Religious connotations 
aside, the advocates of an originally secular meaning of fides disagree widely on the exact 
sense of this concept in Monarchy and Republic. On one hand, some authors believe that the 
original fides was devoid of any moral value. It conveyed ideas such as guarantee for promise 
or the physical power that a person had over another. The moral connotations of fides came 
about only in imperial times, following its use as a rhetorical term. On the other hand, some 
authors contend that the moral sense of “confidence that one reposes” has always been the 
core meaning of fides.24    
These academic disputes demonstrate that, given the scarcity of extant texts from the 
Monarchymonarchy and Early Republic periods, it is not possible to identify precisely the 
original meaning of fides. The sources of the Later Republic, however, allow for a more 
precise investigation. Freyburger demonstrated that, by the end of Republic, the central 
meaning of fides was confidence, in the active form of confidence reposed and the passive 
sense of confidence enjoyed or creditworthiness.25 The active sense of fides designated the 
action of reposing confidence in, or giving credit to someone, in the sense of believing that he 
will act in accordance with his social status. In Partitiones Oratoriae, Cicero equated the 
active fides with a belief (opinio): “fides is a firmly established opinion, while emotion is the 
excitement of the mind to either pleasure or annoyance or fear or desire.”26 In other contexts, 
such as “having confidence in someone” (fidem habere), “giving someone due credit” (fides 
habere alicui) or “placing confidence in someone” (confidere alicui), the active meaning of 
fides points to the act of granting or recognizing the good social standing of someone.27 The 
passive meaning of fides was more relevant and used more often than the active form. The 
passive fides connoted “credit” both in the abstract sense of verisimilitude, plausibility 
(probabilitas, quae ad credendum apta sunt),28 and in the social sense of consequence of good 
reputation, good standing.  
Creditworthiness, the passive meaning of fides, emphasises its social nature. People were 
perceived as trustworthy as a result of their honourable behaviour, but also as a consequence 
of their social and economic status. The higher a person’s social rank and wealth were, the 
greater the social credit that was granted to him. The direct proportionality between social 
standing and creditworthiness explains why, in the archaic period, only the rich and powerful 
enjoyed a plenitude of fides. This does not mean that the more socially humble did not enjoy 
fides—creditworthiness; their credit, however, was inferior to that of the dominant class. This 
situation is illustrated in Table 1.4 of the Law of the Twelve Tables, which provides that only 
a property-holder (adsiduus) could act as guarantor (vindex) for another property holder, 
whereas anyone could be guarantor for a lower-class citizen (proletarius).29 Similarly, in a 
relation of patronage (clientela), fides of the patron (patronus) and that of the client (cliens) 
                                                 
23 Georges Dumézil, Idées Romaines, supra note 18 at 55-56. 
24 See Eduard Frankel, “Zur Geschichte des Wortes Fides”, 71 Rheinisches Museum fur Philologie (1916), 187; 
Richard Heinze, “Fides”, 64 Hermes (1928), 140; Andre Piganiol, “Venire in fidem”, 5 Revue Internationale des 
Droits de l’Antiquité (1950), 339, 345; Gerhard von Beseler, “Fides” in Atti del Congresso Internazionale di 
Diritto Romano, vol. 1 (1934), 133-143; Luigi Lombardi, Dalla “fides” alla “bona fides” (1961); Joseph 
Hellegouarc’h, Le Vocabulaire latin des relations et des partis politiques sous la République (2d ed., 1972). 
25 Freyburger, supra note 11 at 43-66. 
26 Cicero, A Dialogue Concerning Oratorical Partitions 3, in Charles D. Yonge, The Orations of Marcus Tullius 
Cicero, vol. 4 (1879), 488. 
27 Hellegouarc’h, supra note 24 at 33. 
28 Freyburger, supra note 11 at 43. 
29“For a better-off person (adsiduus), let the vindex (surety) be a better-off person; for a proletarian tough citizen, 
let anyone who wishes be vindex.” (A. Arthur Schiller, Roman Law: Mechanisms of Development” (1978), 150).  
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entailed different obligations: protection and loyal obedience, respectively.30 The wealth and 
power of the socially superior facilitated the maintenance of their social credit by giving them 
the possibility to offer protection, by rendering them less impressionable, and by conferring 
higher authority (auctoritas) on them. Conversely, given that social credit was one of the most 
valuable possessions of a person, the powerful had strong incentives to abide by the standards 
of behaviour associated with their status, in order to maintain their trustworthiness in the eyes 
of society.31 
The passive meaning of fides acquired three main subsequent meanings: loyalty, promise, and 
protection.32 The transition of the basic passive meaning of fides, “acquired confidence” 
(credit) to a secondary passive meaning, “the attitude that attracts confidence,” generated the 
connotation of “loyalty.”  
Such semantic transition from the general notion to the attitude consistent with that notion 
was a natural occurrence in Latin. The Latin had a tendency to “moralize” abstract notions by 
transferring them into the realm of mores, the Roman system of customs, virtues, and 
values.33 In Roman society, creditworthiness was tightly related to social morals: it was the 
assessment by society of the behaviour of an individual. The desire to attract or reinforce the 
confidence of others and thus to gain or preserve social credit was one of the main reasons of 
one’s loyalty. Loyal behavior, manifested by the effective keeping of one’s word, is the 
objective and traditional meaning of good faith-loyalty. The subjective aspect, which 
represents a late semantic addition, designates a moral virtue with various facets: the inner 
propensity to keep one’s word because of ethical standards and ideals, honesty and sincerity, 
in the sense of absence of deceptive intent or ulterior motive.34 Objective loyalty generated 
good reputation (fama) and social credit (fides), and therefore was very important to Romans, 
who were careful to avoid the suspicion of improbity (suspicio perfidiae), which could attract 
infamy (infamia). 
Another meaning of the passive fides is fides as promise. Fides-promise encompassed various 
forms of promises: a simple verbal commitment (e.g., seruare fidem), a promise formalized 
by shaking the right hand (e.g., fidem dare), an oath (e.g., ius iurandum), or the most solemn 
oath, a public treaty (foedus). In all such instances fides-promise was in fact a particular 
instance of fides-credit. The majority of Latin expressions in which fides refers to a promise 
can be construed as referring to the pledging of one’s credit as a guarantee for an obligation.35 
Fidem dare literally means “offering one’s credit as pledge;” fidem obligare or fidem 
obstringere could be interpreted as binding one’s credit through a solemn act; fidem 
promittere literally means “putting forward one’s credit;” fidem liberare, in conjunction with 
fidem obligare, signifies the discharge of one’s credit by fulfilling the promise.36  
Fides-protection is the outmost point in the evolution of fides. Latin is the only Indo-
European language that presents this connotation of the concept fides. Similarly to fides-
loyalty and to fides-promise, fides-protection comes from the basic meaning of the passive 
fides, namely “social credit.” The notion of fides-protection appears in the context of invoking 
or soliciting the fides of a powerful person, generally through loud calls and imprecations. 
The person whose protection was invoked could not remain indifferent to such calls, usually 
made in the presence of others, without jeopardizing his credit. Once the credit of a person 
                                                 
30 See Section 4.3 below. 
31 Thomas Collett Sandars, The Institutes of Iustinian (1970), 36. 
32 Freyburger, supra note 11 at 49-74. 
33 Ibid. at 57. 
34 Ibid. at 54. 
35 See Section 5.2 below. 
36 Freyburger, supra note 11 at 65-66. 
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was put in play in such a fashion, the solicited person had to honour the request of protection 
in order to maintain his good standing or even to avoid the perverse effects of infamy.    
Corroborating both fundamental meanings of fides, i.e., confidence reposed and confidence 
aroused in someone else, Benveniste maintained that the parties to a relation involving 
confidence were necessarily on inequality of footing. Idioms such as “to surrender oneself to 
the fides and power of someone else” (se in fidem et potestatem alicuius tradere), or in the 
context of international relations, “to surrender to the fides and sovereign power of the 
Romans” (se in fidem ac dicionem populi Romani tradere), convey the idea that the party that 
reposed fides in another was at the mercy of the latter. Such relations were not unilateral; they 
involved a certain degree of reciprocity: placing confidence in another secured the other’s 
protection. The empowered party exercised authority but had to protect the other, while the 
submissive party had to be obedient but enjoyed protection and security.37 The nature of the 
inequality between parties in a relation based on fides evolved from complete surrender of one 
party, generating the extensive and discretionary power of the other, to an ascendancy of 
moral or spiritual nature. The evolution of private law and the creativity of the praetors in 
Later Republic made possible the creation of bona fides, designating mutual reliance and self-
restraint between contractual partners, which, in a sense, was the opposite of the ancient fides.  
Another important conclusion that these studies entail is the primacy of the social nature of 
fides. The crux of fides was not the inner, moral propensity to abide by promises and officia, 
but the actual behavior, the positive actions that one performed and that created or re-enforced 
the social credit.38 The spread of Hellenistic civilization, the influence of the Stoic 
philosophers, and Cicero’s monumental work, however, considerably augmented the moral 
charge of fides during the last decades of the Republic.    
 
 
4. Fides in divine law (fas) and social customs (boni mores)  
 
During the Monarchy and in the early stages of the Republic, Rome had no clearly defined 
legal system. There was no single sovereign authority to set and enforce the law, and the 
settlement of disputes often amounted to private vengeance. The private order of Rome was 
regulated by three normative systems: fas (divine law), boni mores (social customs), and ius 
(secular law). Divine law was the body of laws regarded as laid down by the gods to regulate 
the behavior of humans on earth. Such rules were binding to all humankind, rather than to a 
given ethnic group, and had primacy over secular or human law. Secular law was the body of 
secular norms comprising legal customs (ius moribus constitutum), and to a lesser extent, 
statutes (lex). Social customs (mos maiorum, later known as boni mores) comprised the body 
of ancestral values and norms of behavior upheld by the Roman community.39 The social 
relations founded on fides were regulated to various extents by the precepts of divine law, 
social customs, and later, secular law.  
 
4.1. Fides and divine law (fas) 
                                                 
37 Émile Benveniste, Le vocabulaire des institutions indo-européennes, vol. 2 (1969), 118-119. See also Timothy 
J. Moore, Artistry and Ideology: Livy’s Vocabulary of Virtue (1989), 36 (“Regardless of which theory is correct 
concerning the origin and basic meaning of fides, the word is clearly at its root connected with relationships of 
trust, and fides when it can be called a virtue is the moral quality of a person or a group which causes that person 
or group to deserve the trust of others.”).     
38 Hellegouarc’h, supra note 24 at 23-27; Zeba A. Crook, Reconceptualising Conversion: Patronage, Loyalty, 
and Conversion in the Religions of the Ancient Mediterranean (2004), 207-208. 
39 James Muirhead, Historical Introduction to the Private Law of Rome (1916), 15-23; Adolf Berger, 
Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law (1953), s.v. “boni mores”, “fas”, “ius (iura)”.  
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The archaic system of justice administration under the Monarchy was built around the college 
of pontiffs. The pontiffs were not priests in the modern sense, as they were not devoted to the 
service of any particular god. They were heads of the national religion, and as such, servants 
of the state. Their power and authority was primarily the result of the significant scientific, 
legal, and religious knowledge they possessed.40  
From presiding over religious affairs and rituals, the pontiffs gradually became directly 
involved in the administration of justice in general, criminal or civil.41 The boundaries of the 
pontiffs’ jurisdiction are unclear. It is generally assumed that the priests of ancient Rome had 
a great share in the administration of justice, but is not easily determined what that share was. 
The question is rendered more complex by the fact that religious matters penetrated all 
aspects of life, blurring the line between religious, secular, and social norms. What can be said 
with certitude is that in the early Monarchy the administration of justice by pontifical judges 
gave a strong religious nature to the Roman law in general.  
Towards the end of the Monarchy, the separation of the royal and pontifical offices, and the 
subordination of the latter to the former, generated a process of separation in law between 
secular and religious and between public and private. At the jurisdictional level, the separation 
of the offices of king (rex) and pontiff (pontifex) led to the extension of regal authority over 
the direct administration of criminal and civil justice. The king judged the most important 
criminal and civil cases in person, and entrusted the lesser ones to senators. Starting with the 
reign of Servius Tullius (578-535 BC), public cases were separated from the private disputes, 
the latter being delegated to private judges. The pontiffs retained jurisdiction over religious 
and ceremonial matters, such as the management of the state Calendar.42  
As long as the civil and religious judicial authorities were in the same hands, divine and 
secular law were not always clearly separated. A great part of early criminal law in the early 
Monarchy, for instance, had a sacral character in the sense that the wrongful behaviour 
amounted to an offense against society and a sin against the gods of the community at the 
same time. The idea of crime independent of sin emerged only toward the end of the 
Monarchy, when religious and secular authorities were separated.43 
Thus, for the most part of the Monarchy, the laws regulating public wrongs belonged to divine 
and secular laws at the same time.44 The scattered extant references to public wrongs allow us 
to reconstruct some of the sanctions that the pontiffs applied for offenses against society and 
the gods. Minor offenses against divine authority were redeemable by offerings to the 
affronted deity (hostia piacularis) and possibly compensation to the injured person. More 
serious offenses, however, which brought a divine curse over the entire community, could be 
purged only by the perpetrator’s death. Where the pontiffs found such inexpiable wrongs, they 
proceeded to outlawing the wrongdoer (sacratio) by declaring that he was consecrated to the 
gods of the underworld (sacer esto). Declaring a man sacer was one of the earliest penalties 
for public wrongs, and among the most severe.45 Homo sacer was an outcast in every sense of 
the word: he was banned from taking part in any institution of the state, civil or religious, and 
his goods were forfeit to the service of the offended deity (sacratio bonorum). He was no 
                                                 
40 The pontiffs (“bridge-builders”) derived their names from their function, which was as sacred as it was 
politically important, of conducting the works of building and demolition of bridges over the Tiber, Theoror 
Mommsen, The History of Rome, trans. by William P. Dickson, vol. 1 (1885), 230. 
41 Edwin C. Clark, History of Roman Private Law, vol. 1 (1906), 432. 
42 Clark, supra note 41 at 465-466. 
43 Ibid. at 450-451. 
44 The earliest formulated Roman law, that of public wrongs, belongs to both divine and secular law (ibid. at 
575-576). 
45 See Berger, supra note 39, s.v. “sacer.” 
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longer divinely protected and could be killed by anyone with impunity. The severity with 
which the breach of divine law was met ensured the efficacy of these rules, despite their 
religious rather than civil nature.46 
Grave breaches of fides were punished by a declaration of sacer since the earliest times. 
Dionysius recounted that, since the times of Romulus, breach of fides in a patronage relation 
was an “impious and unlawful” act that rendered the disloyal patron or client liable to be put 
to death with impunity.47 The penalty of sacratio for breach of fides in patronage is officially 
stipulated for the first time in the Law of the Twelve Tables. Table 8.21 provides that “if a 
patron defrauds a client, let him be sacer (accursed).”48    
Breach of a solemn promise was another instance of breach of fides that came within the 
purview of the pontiffs. Breach of promises reinforced by an appeal to the gods was 
considered a sin against the divinities invoked, and thus attracted religious sanctions. The 
reinforcement of a promise by a solemn appeal to gods was accomplished either by a solemn 
oath (iusiurandum) or by a solemn promise (the ancient sponsio). 
The solemn oath was the practice by which a god was called upon to witness the promisor’s 
creditworthiness and to punish him in case of breach. The Romans appealed to various deities 
to witness their pledge of fides in a solemn promise. According to Titus Livius, the Romans 
used to swear on Jupiter, the king deity of ancient Rome and the patron of laws and social 
order.49 Dionysius mentioned that the early Romans used the altar of Hercules (called Ara 
Maxima, “the greatest altar”), built in the cattle market, to make solemn promises in their 
commercial transactions.50 The custom of invoking Hercules when concluding contracts, and 
confirming them by oath, led to the identification of Hercules with Dius Fidius, the god of 
fides. Hercules and Dius Fidius were used interchangeably as recipients of oaths. Dius Fidius, 
in turn, was replaced by the goddess Fides as recipient and protector of promises guaranteed 
with the promisor’s fides.51  
Despite not being recognized under secular law, promises made before the gods and 
guaranteed with fides were taken very seriously. Dionysius remarked that, after Numa had 
raised fides to the rank of goddess, an oath taken upon a man’s own fides was the greatest 
form of promise, weighing even heavier than the presence of witnesses.52 Gellius also pointed 
out the extreme rarity of failure to perform an undertaking entered into within sight and 
hearing of a deity.53 
Because divinities were invoked, violation of a sworn promise or a false oath were considered 
acts of sacrilege and came under the sway of divine law. Perjury, if premeditated and 
intentional, was one of the grave sins for which no offering (piacularis hostia) could bring 
atonement. Such a sin brought excommunication from the community, and in the most serious 
instances, forfeiture to the divine wrath by pontifical outlawing of the wrongdoer (sacratio).54 
                                                 
46 Muirhead, supra note 39 at 15-18. 
47 Earnest Cary, trans., The Roman Antiquities of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, vol. 1 (1937), 343. 
48 Schiller, supra note 29 at 151. 
49 Livy, 21.45 in Livy, The History of Rome: Books XXI-XXX, trans. by Aubrey De Selincourt (1965), 71.  
50 Dionysius, 1.40 in Cary, supra note 47 at 133. 
51 Varro believed Dius Fidius to be the equivalent of the Sabine deity Sancus and of the Greek Hercules (Marcus 
Terentius Varro, On the Latin Language, trans. by Roland G. Kent, vol. 1 (1977), 64-71. 
52 Dionysius, 2.75 in Cary, supra note 47 at 536-537. 
53 “An oath was regarded and kept by the Romans as something inviolable and sacred. This is evident from many 
of their customs and laws…” (Aulus Gellius, 6.18.1 in John C. Rolfe, trans., The Attic Nights of Aulus Gellius, 
vol. 2 (1927), 75. 
54 Abel H. J. Greenidge, Infamia: Its Place in Roman Public and Private Law (1894), 72; John Mason 
Lightwood, The Nature of Positive Law (1883), 191-198.  
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Because of such severe penalties, use of the solemn oath declined with the rise of more 
flexible forms of binding agreements.55 
The ancient form of solemn promise (sponsio) was another form that fell under the 
jurisdiction of the pontiffs.56 In its most primitive form, sponsio designated the ritual of wine 
pouring that was usually part of the solemn oath (iusiurandum) ceremonial. The role of the 
sacrificial wine pouring was to increase the binding force of the solemn oath. It symbolized 
the blood that would be spilt if the gods were affronted by the breach of the promise. In a 
second stage, sponsio as wine pouring became an independent ritual that was used without the 
oath in important agreements of private nature, such as marriage, or in alliances (foedera) 
between different clans.57 In a third stage, the wine-pouring ceremony was omitted, and the 
ancient sponsio became a form of solemn promise involving sacramental formulas.  
The religious solemn promise was intimately connected with fides as observance of 
commitments. As accessory to other solemn acts, the religious solemn promise offered an 
added security by the ritual invocation of the gods to participate in the ceremony. As long as 
the solemn promise was used to reinforce a principal act, it assumed an inferior place as a 
fides alongside the central act, which was entered into with the fullest solemnity of the oath 
(as in the case of a political alliance) or with the ceremonial joining of the right hands (as in 
the case of marriage). At a later stage, the solemn promise developed into a form of making 
formal promises between humans (as opposed to a promise from a human to a god), involving 
the sacramental words “do you undertake?” (dare spondes?), “I undertake” (spondeo). The 
religious element subsisted in this technical form of the solemn promise, albeit implicitly. It is 
likely that breach of promise amounted to breach of fides, the duty to keep one’s promises, 
and constituted an offense against the deities that were called to witness the agreement. 
However, no clear evidence survives that could prove beyond doubt that the pontiffs punished 
breach of the technical solemn promise as a dishonoring of the goddess Fides or of other 
deities.58 
The bond of marriage (foedus matrimonii) was another bond of fides overseen by the pontiffs. 
The use of the word foedus (alliance, bond) indicates that the marriage was a bond of fides. 
Fides and foedus were intimately linked concepts, the former being an indispensable part of 
the latter. At the same time, the bond of marriage was a religious institution. Throughout the 
Monarchy, the Roman marriage was a religious duty that a man owed to his ancestors and to 
himself.59 The ceremony of marriage was a religious one, performed by the pontiffs in the 
presence of ten witnesses. The gesture by which each spouse engaged their fides toward one 
another and toward the gods was the ceremonial joining of the right hands (dextrarum 
                                                 
55 William H. Buckler, Origin and History of Contract in Roman Law Down to the End of the Republican Period 
(1983), 12. 
56 The origins and the functions of the early sponsio are highly controversial. For a review of the main theories 
concerning the ancient sponsio, see Buckler supra note 55 at 17-20. See also Max Kaser, Roman Private Law: A 
Translation, trans. by Rolf Dannenbring (3rd ed., 1980), 49 (“The term sponsio, if the word spondere was 
employed, points to a promise made under oath which originally had not been actionable in civil procedure, but 
which had a religious sanction: he who perjured himself was exposed to the vengeance of the god by whom he 
had sworn”). 
57 Carl W. Westrup, Introduction to Early Roman Law: Comparative Sociological Studies, the Patriarchal Joint 
Family, vol. 4 (1950), 146. See also Michael H. Crawford, “Foedus and Sponsio” 41 Papers of the British 
School at Rome (1973), 1-7.    
58 B.W. Liest, “The Fides Commandment” in Albert Kocourek and John W. Wigmore, Primitive and Ancient 
Legal Institutions (1915) 481, 492-495. 
59 See Fustel de Coulanges, La cité antique: Étude sur le culte, le droit, les institutions de la Grèce et de Rome 
(7th ed., 1879), 41-54.    
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iunctio),60 accompanied by invocations and sacrifices offered to the gods (the goddess Fides 
quite probably included).61 Breaches of marital duties were punished by the pontiffs with 
religious sanctions, forfeiture of property, and in the most severe cases, with consecration to 
the infernal gods.62 
During the Monarchy and in Early Republic, the constraining power of fides was of a 
religious and social, rather than legal nature. Fides did not act as an ordinary security, because 
in case of default it ensured no immediate measure for indemnifying the promisee. Its power 
resided in the threat of religious or social sanctions, rather than in immediate redress for the 
wronged person.  
 
4.2. Fides, social customs (boni mores), ignominy (ignominia), and infamy (infamia) 
 
Mores (plural of mos) were the body of rules of behaviour accepted by the common consent 
of all members of a community. If observed for a long time, they acquired the status of legal 
customs. As a result of centuries of development, mores came to be referred during the 
Republic as mos maiorum, the custom of the forefathers, or mores civitatis, the customs of the 
city. Not strictly customary law, the values of the customs of the forefathers were sufficiently 
authoritative to restrain the excessive exercise of a legal prerogative and to ensure the 
observance of socially recognized duties for which secular law offered no protection. The 
Greek influence in the Hellenistic period led to the transformation of the customs. Writers, 
historians, and orators of that time, such as Plautus, Sallustius, and Titus Livius, decried the 
weakening of the customs of the forefathers by the newly acquired habits. The expression 
“social customs” (boni mores) was introduced to refer to the customs of the forefathers (mos 
maiorum), as contrasted with the new customs, the mali mores.63 
Fides belonged to the customs of the forefathers since ancient times, and numerous authors 
attested to the fact that it was part of the social customs.64 The protection of the customs of the 
forefathers by the Roman censor played an important role in the evolution of the concept of 
fides. 
From the middle of the 5th century BCE until the end of the Republic, the task of watching 
over the Roman social customs was granted to censors (censores). Beside the registration of 
citizens and the assessment of their property (census), and the administration of public 
finances, the censors were charged with regimen morum, the preservation of the social 
customs.65 The censors’ power to decide on the moral worth of a person was a natural 
outgrowth of their principal charge, the census.  
The task of drawing the list of citizens and determining whether or not a person was fit for 
public service granted the censors wide discretionary powers to decide on questions of fact, 
such as whether a citizen had the qualifications required by law or custom for the rank that he 
claimed. The transition from matters of fact to questions of law came naturally, and the 
censors gradually assumed the role of guardians of the principles of Roman morality 
encompassed by the social customs. In this capacity, the censors were able to decide in many 
                                                 
60 Jean Imbert, “Fides et Nexum” in Studi in onore di Vincenzo Arangio-Ruiz, vol. 2, (1953), 339, 352; Le Glay, 
supra note 16 at 280, note 5. 
61 Édouard Cuq, Les Institutions Juridiques des Romains, vol. 1 (2nd ed., 1904), 59.    
62 Muirhead, supra note 39 at 25. 
63 Muirhead, supra note 39 at 18-21; DH Van Zyl, Justice and Equity in Cicero (1991), 96; Berger, supra note 
39, s.v. “mores (mos);” “mores (mos) maiorum;” “boni mores.” 
64 Felix Senn, “Des origines et du contenu de la notion de bonnes mœurs” in Recueil d’études sur les sources du 
droit en l’honneur de François Gény (1934) 53, 62.  
65 Alan E. Astin, “Regimen Morum”, 78 The Journal of Roman Studies (1988), 14-34; Berger, supra note 39, s.v. 
“regimen morum.” 
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matters of private and public life that escaped the reach of secular law. Thus, the censors 
became examiners of the moral worth of individual citizens, and bestowed honour and 
dishonour according to their sense of duty. The various important duties that came to be 
associated with the office of censorship rendered this office a “sacred magistracy” (sanctus 
magistratus), the second most important in the state after the dictatorship.66 
Instances branded by the censors as deviating from the socially desirable rules of conduct 
established by social custom were multiple. A first group of cases concerned the abuse or 
neglect of a legally recognized prerogative. For example, the censors intervened to condemn 
the misuse of power by a head of the family (paterfamilias), who displayed cruelty or over-
indulgence toward members of his family. In the case of a monetary loan, the censors 
condemned the creditor who deprived the debtor of the opportunity to ransom himself, his 
family, or the property given as security, in order to avoid becoming a debtor under arrest 
(addictus).67 In a second group of cases, the censors intervened to enforce certain duties 
(officia) that were not applicable under secular law  but were imposed by social customs, such 
as the respect and obedience that persons in an inferior position owed their superiors 
(obsequium et reverentia), chastity (pudicitia), and the various duties imposed by fides.68 
The censors’ assessment of moral worth and punishment of moral disgrace had a quasi-
judicial nature. Many features of the censorial trial resembled a trial before a judge 
(judicium).69 Several procedural rules were put in place to mitigate the arbitrariness of the 
censors’ decisions. The accused had to be summoned before the censors; there were always 
two censors, and the decision had to be made unanimously; the accused had the right to be 
assisted by an advisor; the censors’ decision had to specify the cause for which the accused 
had been degraded (subscriptio). Despite such similarities with a criminal trial at law, the 
proceedings before the censors did not amount to a full-fledged trial before a judge. As Cicero 
pointed out, many procedural requirements for a regular trial, such as sworn evidence or 
maintenance of records, were often absent from censorial proceedings.70 Moreover, ignominy 
was not a penal punishment. It led to disqualification and loss of social credit, but it did not 
have a criminal nature, as was the case with the praetorian infamy. 
Although ignominy was not a legal penalty, its effects went beyond the mere diminution of 
the social credit that a person enjoyed among his fellow citizens. It created various 
disqualifications or disabilities. For ordinary citizens, the censors could punish those who 
deviated from the standards imposed by custom by expelling them from their tribe and by 
degrading them to the status of aerarians. In case of equestrians, the censors could take away 
their publicly-funded horse (ademptio equi). The censors could also decree the removal of 
senators from the senate (motio or ejectio e senatu).  
Breach of the various duties imposed by fides triggered not only religious or social blame, but 
also censorial condemnation, in the form of the quasi-juridical ignominy, and later, the 
juridical sanction of infamy, provided for by the praetor’s edict and Justinian’s law. 
Throughout most of the Republic, when the censors enjoyed a broad supervision over social 
customs, many instances of breach of fides that came under the censors’ jurisdiction were 
likely to be set forth in the censors’ edict. Because of the scarcity of extant sources, our 
knowledge of the censors’ edict is fragmentary. Nevertheless, some conclusions may be 
drawn from historical circumstances and later regulations. 
The first clue to point toward broad censorial jurisdictional powers over breaches of fides is 
                                                 
66 Arthur H. Clough (ed.), Plutarch’s Lives, vol. 2 (1875), 316. 
67 Muirhead supra note 39 at 161. 
68 Muirhead supra note 39 at 22. See also Greenidge, supra note 54 at 62-74 for a more detailed classification of 
the cases of social digression that attracted censorial punishment. 
69 The censors’ trial was sometimes called iudicium de moribus (Greenidge, supra note 54 at 51). 
70 William Ramsay, A Manual of Roman Antiquities (9th ed., 1873), 164-171. 
 14 
 
the time gap between the pontifical jurisdiction and the secular jurisdiction over breaches of 
fides. The transition from the religious penalties imposed by the pontifical jurisdiction to the 
criminal law penalties at the end of the Republic left a jurisdictional gap that was filled up by 
the censorial condemnation.71 
Jurisdiction over perjury is one such example where the censors filled the jurisdictional gap. 
As show above, during the Monarchy, perjury was a matter of religious law. Premeditated 
false testimony and broken oaths were inexpiable sins, punished by the pontiffs with 
declaration of sacer and consecration to the godly wrath. After the old pontifical sanctions for 
perjury had died out, the secular law declined to punish the offenses against gods. The 
principle of the Roman law was, in respect to perjury, that the wrongs done to the gods were 
for the gods to avenge (deorum injurias diis curae).72 But what the civil law refused to deal 
with, the censorship might and did punish.73 
The scope of the censors’ powers can be inferred also from later documents. Greenidge 
reconstructed the censorial edict based on the praetorian edictum perpetuum and on the Lex 
Julia Municipalis, also known as the Table of Heraclea:74  
We possess a very valuable connecting link between the censor’s and the praetor’s use 
of the conception of infamy in the Lex Julia Municipalis, which is a codification of the 
most permanent portion of the censorian infamia, the cases codified being employed 
as the basis for disqualification for the position of a senator in a municipal town. It is 
in fact the earliest codification—at least the earliest known to us—of the principles 
usually recognised by the censors.75 
The hypothesis that the praetorian edict is a continuation of the censors’ edict is supported 
also by the fact that the praetor did not establish infamy as a rule of law, but built on the pre-
existing notion of infamy to create special exclusions from the right to postulate in court for 
persons found guilty of infamy.76 
Based on the two documents mentioned before, it is quite likely that the censors had 
jurisdiction over several relations where breach of fides was considered a particularly 
condemnable deviation from social custom: partnership, deposit, mandate, guardianship, and 
fiduciary agreement. Starting with the censors’ edict, breach of fides in such relations was 
regarded as severe moral turpitude, and consequently was punished by ignominy. In later 
times a condemnatory judgment for breach of fides in such relations attracted infamy, 
provided for by the praetor’s edict and by Justinian’s law.77 Cicero emphasized that breach of 
fides in such relations was a particularly heinous wrongdoing: 
For if there are any private actions of the greatest, I may almost say, of capital 
importance, they are these three—the actions about trust (fiducia), about guardianship 
                                                 
71 Greenidge, supra note 54 at 66-67. 
72 Cornelius Tacitus, Annals, 1.73 in Michael Grant (trans.), The Annals of Imperial Rome (1989), 74. 
73 Greenidge, supra note 54 at 72. 
74 The Lex Julia Municipalis does not contain the words ignominia or infamia, but in treating the cases of 
disqualification for certain public offices, it enumerates nearly the same cases as those that appeared almost two 
centuries later as cases of infamia in the edictum perpetuum. The Lex excludes persons who fall within its terms 
from being senators, decurions, or counselors of their city, from voting in the senate of their city, and from 
occupying magistracies that gave access to the Senate. 
75 Greenidge supra note 54 at 116-117. 
76 William Smith, Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities (2nd ed., 1859) s.v. “infamia;” Watson agreed that 
it is quite likely that the praetorian infamia was based on the censorian infamia (Alan Watson, Roman Private 
Law Around 200 B.C. (1971), 143). 
77 In contrast with the censorian ignominy, the only purpose of the praetorian infamy was to preserve the dignity 
of the praetor’s court by disqualifying the ill-reputed members from initiating legal actions in this court as 
representatives or advocates of a party to the trial. Therefore, only a person of integrity was allowed by the Edict 
to postulate. (Smith, supra note 76 s.v. “infamia”). 
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(tutela), and about partnership (societas). For it is equally perfidious and wicked to 
break faith (fidem frangere), which is the bond of life, and to defraud one’s ward who 
has come under one’s guardianship, and to deceive a partner who has come himself 
with one in business.78 
Guardianship offers a good example of how fides was protected by the praetor’s 
infamy, and in earlier times, by the censorial ignominy. According to Aulus Gellius, 
guardianship was among the most important relations of fides that a man could have, 
being surpassed only by parenthood. Wards entrusted to the fides of a guardian had 
primacy over the latter’s clients, guests, or spouse. The duty to protect the wards, like 
that to protect the clients, was among a man’s most sacred roles springing from 
fides:In accordance with the usage of the Roman people the place next after parents 
should be held by wards entrusted to our honor and protection (fidei tutelaeque 
nostrae creditos); that second to them came clients, who also had committed 
themselves to our honor and guardianship (qui sese itidem in fidem patrociniumque 
nostrum dediderunt); Of this custom and practice there are numerous proofs and 
illustrations in the ancient records, of which, because it is now at hand, I will cite only 
this one at present, relating to clients and kindred. Marcus Cato in the speech which he 
delivered before the censors Against Lentulus wrote thus: ‘Our forefathers regarded it 
as a more sacred obligation to defend their wards than not to deceive a client.’79 
The praetorian supervision of guardianship was extremely strict. No mischief was tolerated, 
and defaulting on the part of the guardian triggered infamy even if was caused by accidental 
circumstances. Moreover, the guardian could be condemned for infamy even for mere 
suspicion of misadministration of the ward’s affairs. Guardians were also prohibited from 
marrying their wards or from giving them in marriage to their sons, because such acts were 
deemed tantamount to a confession of maladministration. These harsh rules attest to the fact 
that the praetors were concerned with preserving guardian’s creditworthiness, to the point 
where not even the appearance or suspicion of breach of fides was tolerated. According to 
Greenidge, these severe rules were emblematic of the manner in which fides was protected by 
ignominy and infamy throughout the history of Roman law.80  
As Greenidge convincingly argued, punishment for breaches of fides in such relations set 
forth in the Lex Julia Municipalis and in the praetor’s edictuum perpetuum is the continuation 
of a similar treatment applied in earlier times by the censors. Hence, many of the rulings 
established by early censorship in private law relations must have been carried over into the 
classical and post-classical infamy.81 
 
4.3. Between social customs and secular law: Patronage (clientela) and friendship (amicitia)  
 
Roman society of Later Republic and Empire was a growing machinery of personal networks 
of friendships, patrons and clients, lubricated by socially-defined duties attached to given 
positions or statuses (officia), and by authoritative customary principles. As Gelzer 
insightfully remarked, “the entire Roman people, both the ruling circle and the mass of voters 
whom they ruled, was, as a society, permeated by multifarious relationships based on fides 
and on personal connections...”82  
                                                 
78 Cicero, For Q. Roscius, the Actor 6.16, in Charles D. Yonge (trans.), The Orations of Marcus Tullius Cicero, 
vol. 1 (1878), 92-93. 
79 Aulus Gellius 5.13.1-4, in John C. Rolfe (trans.), The Attic Nights of Aulus Gellius, vol. 1 (1927) at 418-
421. 
80 Greenidge, supra note 54 at 138-140. 
81 Greenidge, supra note 54 at 66-67. 
82 Mathias Gelzer, The Roman Nobility, trans. by Robin Seager (1969), 139. 
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Patronage and friendship were both social relations based on fides.83 The link between the two 
institutions is controversial. Traditionally, the two institutions were regarded as fundamentally 
different. Friendship designated a relation between free and equal persons, based on mutual 
affection and loyalty; patronage was seen as a relation of dependence between persons of 
unequal social standing, wealth, or power, motivated by need and self-interest.84  
As patronage evolved from an ancient serfdom relationship of complete subservience and 
dominance to a relation based on ethical imperatives, the line between patronage and 
friendship became blurred.85 By Later Republic, patronage became a relation based on fides 
and esteem (gratia), in which affection and asymmetrical loyalty were due. Because of this 
transformation, by Later Republic, friendship and patronage were based on the same ethical 
concepts: kindness (benignitas), trust (fides), goodwill (benevolentia), and honor 
(existimatio).86 The fundamental difference between the two types of relations sprung from 
the position of the parties relative to each other: whereas friendship was based on equality of 
footing, community of interests, and parity of mutual favors, the client in a patronage was by 
definition unable to return favors of equal importance and settle his debt of honor to his 
patron.87   
 
 
5. Fides, bona fides, and the secular law (ius) 
 
In Rome, as elsewhere, the first rules that were articulated into laws concerned public wrongs, 
offenses against society as a whole or against the gods, who cursed the entire society. As 
noted in Section 4.1 above, during the Monarchy, public wrongs involving fides were 
punishable by pontiffs under the divine law. In the early Republic, breaches of fides were 
regarded as offenses against the traditional values of the community and were punished by the 
censors with ignominy. 
Legal rules concerning private wrongs, i.e., wrongdoings against the person or property of an 
individual, which did not affect the community or the gods, emerged much later.88 Apart from 
the alleged reforms of Servius Tullius,89 little is known about the legal regime of private 
wrongs during the Monarchy. 
Breach of fides, as such, was never recognized as a direct cause of action under secular law. 
The Roman civil law presupposed the multitude of social relations based on fides and the 
social or religious mechanisms to prevent or remedy breaches of confidence. Until the 
development of the actions arising from agreements made in good faith (bonae fidei iudicia) 
by the peregrine praetor, divine law and social customs ensured that the religious and social 
and aspects of fides worked side by side to enforce duties and promises. 
Although during the Monarchy and in Early Republic the secular law did not deal directly 
with breaches of fides, the contract of surety (nexum) and the formal promise (sponsio) were 
two institutions in which the legal norms and the social dictates of fides were tightly 
                                                 
83 “The tie between friends, like that between patrons and clients, was one of fides.” (P.A. Brunt, The Fall of the 
Roman Republic and Related Essays (1988), 39). 
84 Koenraad Verboven, The Economy of Friends: Economic Aspects of Amicitia and Patronage in the Late 
Republic (2002), 49. 
85 This dividing line was blurred also by the use of friendship (amicitia) as a euphemism for relations of 
dependence between patron and client (Verboven, supra note 84 at 49). 
86 The common ethic framework led some authors to consider patronage as a variant of friendship (ibid. at 11). 
87 Ibid. at 62. 
88 Clark, supra note 41 at 581-608. 
89 See Dionysius 4.9, in Earnest Cary, (trans.), The Roman Antiquities of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, vol. 2 
(1939), 293-297.  
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interwoven. Even in such cases, however, the formal vestment, not underlying substantial 
transaction, was the source of liability. 
 
5.1. Fides and nexum 
 
In early Roman society, sale and loan were the principal business transactions. In a sale, the 
purchaser was protected by the seller’s obligation to repay double the value of the sale in case 
of eviction. In a loan of money, the only thing that the lender got immediately in return was a 
promise to pay. Therefore, to induce the borrower to repay, the lender used various means of 
pressure. A destitute debtor would first relinquish his property, then would offer to set off the 
debt by his or his family’s labor. To compel the debtor to transfer the property or to provide 
the labor, the creditor, often a patrician, had the option to keep the debtor, frequently a 
plebeian, in chains or in prison. This form of surety was accomplished through the institution 
of nexum.90 
Nexum was a solemn act, performed in the form of a sale. It involved the use of copper 
and scales (per aes et libram) and the pronouncement of solemn formulae (nuncupatio). The 
object of the moot sale was a thing, or through a legal fiction, the debtor’s person (nexus). 
Bound to his creditor by a relation of fides, the debtor submitted himself to the discretion of 
the creditor until full repayment of the debt.91  
According to Titus Livius, nexum was one of the strongest bonds of fides.92 As Imbert 
emphasised, the reference to fides in this passage was not a mere rhetorical twist. Fides, in 
this context, did not mean the moral fides of the first century BCE; it designated the ancient 
social relation of submission and discretionary power.93  
The religious and social imperatives of fides, recognized by the divine law and the social 
customs, failed to shelter debtors from abuses or cruel treatments by their creditors, and Titus 
Livius remarked that the link of fides became one of punishment.94 
 
5.2. Fides, sponsio, and stipulatio 
 
Section 4.1 above shows that the ancient solemn promise (sponsio) belonged to divine law 
and to pontifical jurisdiction. Because of the absence of sources, there has been extensive 
debate concerning the period when sponsio became actionable under the secular law, but no 
consensus has emerged. It is conjectured that this happened as a consequence of the Lex 
Poetelia of c. 326 BCE,95 or of the adoption of the Lex Silia, probably in 277 BCE.96 The 
discovery of the new fragments of Gaius in 1933,97 however, showed that sponsio, understood 
                                                 
90 Henry John Roby, Roman Private Law in the Times of Cicero and of the Antonines, vol. 1 (2000), 309; Jean-
Claude Richard, “Patricians and Plebeians: The Origins of a Social Dichotomy” in K. A. Raaflaub (ed.), Social 
Struggles in Archaic Rome (2005), 107, 119. The literature on nexum is vast and marked by many controversies. 
As Buckler observed, “There is no more disputed subject in the whole history of Roman Law than the origin and 
development of this one contract.” (Buckler, supra note 55 at 22).  
91 The oldest mention of nexum comes from the Law of the Twelve Tables: “When he shall perform nexum and 
mancipium, as his tongue has pronounced, so is there to be a source of rights.” (Table 6.1 in Michael H. 
Crawford (ed.), Roman Statutes, vol. 2 (1996), 583. 
92 Livy, 8.28 in Titus Livius, The History of Rome, trans. by D. Spillan, vol. 1 (1872), 541. 
93 Imbert, supra note 60 at 344. 
94Livy, 6.34 in Titus Livius, The History of Rome, trans. by D. Spillan, vol. 1 (1872) at 433-434. 
95 Clark, supra note 41 at 618. 
96 Muirhead, supra note 39 at 230.  
97 See Francis de Zulueta, “The New Fragments of Gaius”, 24 The Journal of Roman Studies (1934), 168-186, 
and 25 The Journal of Roman Studies (1935), 19-32, and 26 The Journal of Roman Studies (1936), 174-186. 
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as a promise to pay a definite sum of money, was known and actionable at the time of the 
Law of the Twelve Tables.98  
Sponsio probably appeared in secular law in three capacities: (a) as a general form of contract 
adapted to a multitude of transactions; (b) as a form used in procedural law; and (c) as a mode 
of contracting suretyship.99 In all three forms, sponsio consisted of a question asked by the 
promisee and answered by the promisor. The answer had to conform literally to the question, 
any difference or interruption between question and answer rendering the sponsio void. 
During the early Republic, as the force of the religious law decreased, the religious charge of 
sponsio started to fade, and the word spondere (“I undertake”) became obsolete.100 Thus, a 
simplified version of sponsio was created, in the form of stipulatio. In contrast with sponsio, 
which was confined to Roman citizens only, stipulatio could be used by non-Romans as well, 
and could be expressed in any terms, provided that the question and the answer corresponded 
and were unambiguous. From this moment onward, stipulatio became the generic name for 
formal promises, and sponsio was restricted to the special case where the word spondere was 
used in the question and answer.101   
The scope of stipulatio was very broad: any agreement could be given legal effect if its formal 
requirements were observed. Most notably, stipualtio was used to provide a personal security. 
In Gaius’s time (AD 130-180) three forms of suretyship were formed through stipulatio: 
sponsio, fidepromissio, and fideiussio. Sponsio and fidepromissio could be used to guarantee 
only obligations from verbal contracts (verbis). Sponsio was accessible only to Roman 
citizens, whereas fidepromissio was open also to peregrines. The expressions used in sponsio 
were:  
- Do you solemnly engage to grant the same? (Idem dare spondes?)   
- I bid it be done on my fides (Spondeo, fide mea esse iubeo) 
In fideipromissio, the solemn words were: 
- Do you promise the same, on your fides? (Idem fideipromittis?)  
- I promise the same of my fides (Fide promitto)  
In Justinian’s time, all three forms were fused into one type of suretyship, the fideiussio, 
which did not require any of the formalities of sponsio or fideipromissio. It merely implied a 
request (iussio) that the principal debtor be given credit on the fides of the surety. Hence 
fideiussio was used to guarantee any kind of obligation: verbal, literal, real, consensual, and in 
some opinions, even natural.102 
The creation of stipulatio was a cornerstone event not only in the Roman law of contract, but 
also in the role of fides as guarantee for promises. The simplified form of question and answer 
provided by stipulatio rendered legally binding many relations that hitherto depended largely 
on fides and its religious and moral penalties. 
 
                                                 
98 Jolowicz and Nicholas, supra note 10 at 280-281. 
99 Buckler supra note 55 at 95. The literature on the original nature and role of sponsio and its relation to 
stipulatio is enormous. For a review of the main theories, see Reinhard Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations – 
Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition (1996), 117-125. 
100 It is not possible to determine with precision the date when stipulatio sprung from sponsio. Buckler believed  
that this should have happened with the creation of the magistracy of the peregrine praetor (Buckler supra note 
55 at 98). Kaser believed that the stipulatio of the classical law was created by the fusion of the ancient sponsio 
with the secular forms of surety for appearance in court (vades and praedes). See Kaser, supra note 56 at 49-50.  
101 Buckler supra note 55 at 96-98 
102 Berger, supra note 39, s.v. “adpromissio”, “sponsio”; Reinhard Zimmermann, “Stipulatio” in Simon 
Hornblower and Antony Spawforth (eds.), Oxford Classical Dictionary (3rd ed., 1996), 1444-1445; Rudloph 
Sohm et al., The Institutes: A Textbook of the History and System of Roman Private Law, trans. by James C. 
Ledlie, (3rd ed., 1907), 298-299; Alan Watson, The Law of Obligations in the Later Roman Republic (1965), 1-
10. 
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5.3. Fides, the upright man (bonus vir,) and good faith (bona fides) 
 
The way in which the notion of good faith (bona fides) emerged from the concept of fides 
remains largely unclear, owing to the semantic diversity of fides, but also to the scarcity of 
original resources from the Republican period. Most likely, bona fides drew upon both fides 
as guarantee for promise and fides as standard of behaviour required by divine law, social 
custom, and in certain relations by secular law.103 
Roman law historians linked the emergence of bona fides with the activity of the upright man 
(bonus vir), the arbitrator voluntary chosen by the parties (arbiter ex compromisso), and the 
peregrine praetor (paetor peregrinus), within a socio-economic context characterized by the 
intensification of commercial exchanges among Romans and between them and the 
peregrines. At the same time, bona fides was consecrated by the actions arising from 
agreements made in good faith (bonae fidei iudicia) as the juridical yardstick for determining 
the extent of the condemnation. In post-classical times, bona fides lost its technical sense and 
was again conceptualized in an ethical sense, opposite the notions of intention to harm 
(malignitas), deceit (dolus), or violence (vis).104   
Bona fides was regarded by some authors as the fides of the Roman bonus vir, called to play 
the role of arbiter in an extra-judicial dispute.105 Bonus vir was a Roman male citizen who was 
seen as a model of honesty and righteousness.106 To be worthy of the name bonus vir, a high 
fides-creditworthiness was required: the person had to enjoy excellent reputation, reinforced 
by skills, repeated praiseworthy acts, and special concern for communitarian values. The 
moral character of the bonus vir had a double aspect: negative and positive. The negative side 
had to do with being free of fault; the positive side was the active proof of trustworthiness, 
manifested in repeated commendable actions.107   
An important aspect of the profile of the bonus vir was being an esteemed arbiter. In this 
context, bona fides represented the fides of the bonus vir arbiter, as materialized in an 
equitable and just decision. The arbitration of the bonus vir is one of the oldest methods of 
extra-judicial settlement of conflicts practiced in Rome. Strong evidence of the popularity and 
pervasiveness of this type of arbitration in Roman life is the acronym ABV, arbitrium boni 
viri, which appeared in a list of legal abbreviations dating back to the times of the Law of the 
Twelve Tables, compiled by the Roman grammarian Marcus Valerius Probus in the second 
half of the first century AD.108    
                                                 
103 See Martin J. Schermaier, “Bona Fides in Roman Contract Law” in R. Zimmermann and S. Whittaker (eds.), 
Good Faith in European Contract Law (2000), 63, 82. 
104 Kaser, supra note 56. 
105 See, e.g., Schermaier, who argued that the ideals of bonus vir and bene agere (proper conduct) were the main 
pillars of bona fides (Schermaier, supra note 103 at 89); Gagarin and Woodruff argued that bona fides was a 
standard applied by the bonus vir, which involved a moral judgment of the parties’ behaviour (Michael Gagarin 
and Paul Woodruff, “Early Greek Legal Thought” in F. Dycus Miller and C.A. Biondi (eds.), A History of the 
Philosophy of Law from the Ancient Greeks to the Scholastics (2007), 7, 29; Schmidlin examined the ethical 
content of fides and pointed out that bona fides is associated with bonus vir and the societas virorum bonorum 
(Bruno Schmidlin, “Der verfahrensrechtliche Sinn des ex fide bona im Formularprozessin”, in Ulrich von 
Lubtow et al. (eds.), De Iustitia et Iure: Festgabe fur Ulrich von Lubtow zum 80. Geburtstag (1980), 359-371, 
discussed in Van Zyl, supra note 63 at 98, n. 406. 
106 Berger, supra note 39, s.v. “vir bonus.” Cato the Elder defined the bonus vir as a skilled farmer: “And when 
they would praise a worthy man (bonus vir), their praise took this form: ‘good husbandman, good farmer’; one 
so praised was thought to have received the greatest commendation.” (Cato, On Agriculture, preface, in William 
D. Hooper (trans.), Marcus Porcius Cato, On agriculture (1934), 3).  
107 Leist, supra note 22 at 485. 
108 Marcus Valerius Probus, “On the Single Letters of Fragments” in Josef Aistermann, De M Valerio Probo 
Berytio (1910); Derek Roebuck and Bruno de Loynes de Fumichon, Roman Arbitration (2004), 64. 
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Arbitration by the bonus vir was a purely private and informal method of resolving disputes. 
The disputing parties were free to choose any man enjoying a strong reputation for honesty 
and righteousness, and entrust him with the settlement of a dispute they were unable to sort 
out by themselves. In settling the dispute, the bonus vir was called to exercise equitable 
discretion and decide according to the social standards of fairness and good sense. Although 
the arbiter bonus vir was not bound by the positive law, as a righteous man, he was expected 
to take it into consideration.109 The criterion used by the bonus vir in rendering his decisions 
was “that which is right and equitable” (bonum et aequum), a standard combining objective 
elements and principles derived from equity (aequitas).110 The Roman state was not involved 
in any stage of the dispute settlement. It was not involved in the appointment of the arbiter, as 
was the case under the procedures known as legis actiones, iudicis arbitrive postulatio, or 
arbiter ex compromisso. The state could not be called either to compel the bonus vir to 
perform the duties he had undertaken or to enforce his decision. Any party dissatisfied with 
bonus vir’s decision could bring the matter before the state courts.111 
The disputes brought before the bonus vir were diverse. Marcus Porcius Cato (commonly 
surnamed “the Censor” or “the Elder”) provides a variety of instances, mostly involving 
farming matters, where the judgment of a bonus vir was called upon to solve a disagreement. 
Such disputes concerned agricultural leases,112 contracts for the harvesting of an olive crop,113 
the quality of wine,114 or determining the boundary between properties.115 Justinian’s Digest 
also provides many examples of cases where the judgment of a bonus vir was required, such 
as determining the amount of a dowry,116 the shares in a partnership,117 the length of time that 
should be allowed to carry out a payment obligation contracted in Rome but executable in 
Ephesus,118 or the fulfilment of the condition in a conditional sale.119   
Instances of bonus vir arbitration that have come down to us emphasize two important 
characteristics of this type of conflict resolution. First, the role of the bonus vir was 
predominantly that of an assessor, figuring out the proper solution using common sense 
calculations. His role was often confined to deciding specific and foreseeable issues in 
contracts rather than judging whether a wrong has been committed.  
Second, the meaning of bonus vir evolved from designating a concrete trustworthy person to 
an abstract standard of judgment that was expected from a person in a position to decide for 
someone else (e.g., the surveyor or the guardian who were bound “to reason as a bonus vir 
would do,” ac si viri boni arbitratu).120  
Bonus vir as an idealized standard of reasoning became common. The Digest provides 
numerous examples where the standard of bonus vir was used to give legal effect to 
incomplete 121 or ambiguous 122 documents. Eventually, the Romans imposed the standard of 
                                                 
109 “Horace, Epistles,1.16.40-45 in Niall Rudd (trans.), Satires and Epistles (1979), 161. 
110 Adele C. Scafuro, The Forensic Stage: Settling Disputes in Graeco-Roman New Comedy (1997), 141-153. 
111 Roebuck and Fumichon, supra note 108 at 46-66. 
112 Cato, On Agriculture 149.1, in William D. Hooper, supra note 106 at 135-136. 
113 Cato, On Agriculture 144.2-3, 145.3 in William D. Hooper, supra note 106 at 127-131. 
114 Cato, On Agriculture 148.1, in William D. Hooper, supra note 106 at 133-134. 
115 Agennius Urbicus, On Land Disputes, in Brian Campbell, The Writings of the Roman Land Surveyors: 
Introduction, Text, Translation and Commentary (2000), 46.  
116 Dig. 32.43 in Theodor Mommsen and Paul Krueger (eds.), The Digest of Justinian, vol. 3, trans. by Alan 
Watson (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985) at 86-87. 
117 Dig. 17.2.6, in Mommsen and Krueger, vol. 2, supra note 116 at 498. 
118 Dig. 45.1.137 in Mommsen and Krueger, vol. 4, supra note 116 at 675. 
119 Dig. 18.1.7 in Mommsen and Krueger, vol. 2, supra note 116 at 514.  
120 See supra note 115 and note 116; see also Scafuro, supra note 110 at 141-153.  
121 Ulpian provided a hypothetical example of the usefulness of the standard of bonus vir in the case of an 
ambiguous will. If the testator instructed the heir to make three payments, one each year, it would mean three 
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bonus vir to all forms of arbitration, including arbiter ex compromissio123 and 
recuperatores.124  
The arbitration of the bonus vir is a particularly important stage in the transformation of fides 
from a social and moral value into the legal bona fides. The bonus vir was a trustworthy 
member of the community, abiding by the social code of honour and enjoying a high level of 
social credit (fides). Because of this trustworthiness, the bonus vir was often called to act as 
arbiter in a diverse array of private disputes. His fides was perceived as a strong guarantee that 
his reasoning would be in accord with the general sense of fairness and with the positive legal 
norms. In time, the fides of the bonus vir became an idealized standard of reasoning for those 
in a position to decide for another. Many persons who had discretion to affect another’s 
interests, such as guardians and fiduciary heirs, were required to exercise judgment as a bonus 
vir would, taking into account relevant considerations and remaining disinterested. The bonus 
vir not only possessed the two virtues that were essential for trustworthiness (fides), namely 
justice (iustitia) and prudence (prudentia or sapientia), but was also endowed with an 
uncanny ability to resist self-serving impulses and avoid any suspicion of deceit.125 This 
concept of procedural fides, reinforced by the fides of the peregrine praetor, contributed to the 
genesis of bona fides as a legal concept. 
Between the 4th and 5th century AD, before the drafting of the Justinian compilations, the 
contractual bona fides acquired a double meaning. The objective bona fides was the general 
                                                                                                                                                        
equal payments. If the testator only mentioned that the heir make unequal payments, “those are owed (unless the 
testator has specifically given the choice to the heir) which a good man judges [quas vir bonus fuerit arbitrates] 
consistent with the resources of the deceased and the situation of the property.” (Dig. 33.1.3 in Mommsen and 
Krueger, vol. 3, supra note 116 at 102).    
122 “But, although a fideicommissum worded 'if you should wish’ may not be due, it will be due if the wording is 
‘if you judge it good,’ ‘if you think it suitable,’ ‘if you hold it,’ or ‘shall hold it advantageous.’ For there he has 
not left full discretion to the heir, but has committed a trust to him as an upright man [sed quasi viro bono 
commissum relictum]. Moreover, if a fideicommissum is left ‘to such a one, if he has deserved well of you,’ the 
fideicommissum will certainly be due, provided that the fideicommissary has behaved in a way that an upright 
man would think deserving [quasi apud virum bonum collocare fideicommissarius potuit]. And if left to him ‘if 
he does not offend you,’ it will equally be due, and the heir will not be able to justify a claim that the 
fideicommissary is undeserving, if another man who is upright and not antagonistic would admit him as 
deserving [si alius vir bonus et non infestus meritum potuit admittere].” (Dig. 32.11. in Mommsen and Krueger, 
vol. 3, supra note 116 at 73-74). See also Roebuck and Fumichon, supra note 108 at 62.   
123 Arbiter ex compromisso was appointed by both parties to a conflict, who agreed in an act called 
compromissum to pay a penalty if one or the other failed to comply with the arbiter’s verdict. The activities of 
the bonus vir and arbiter overlapped, but were not identical: whereas the bonus vir mostly assessed facts, the 
arbiter was also authorized to determine the penalty and pronounce judgment. Although the arbiter was held to 
the general standard of bonus vir, the benchmarks for his decisions were set forth in greater detail, according to 
the stage of the judicial act under his scrutiny. He decided ex fide, at the formation stage, ex aequo with regard to 
the object and effect of the act, and ex fide and ex aequo concerning its completion. The extra-judicial arbiter 
judged according to the requirements of the social and moral concepts of fides and aequm. His decisions were 
bonae fidei, as opposed to those of the magistrates, which were stricti iuris (Roebuck and Fumichon, supra note 
108 at 94-152; Friedrich Ludwig von Keller, De la Procedure Civile et des Actions chez les Romains (2nd ed., 
1870), 424-425; Berger, supra note 39, s.v. “arbiter ex compromisso”. 
124 Recuperatio was the procedure designated to settle conflicts between Roman citizens and foreigners. The 
recuperatores acted as private adjudicators in the second stage of the trial (the stage in iure). There were no strict 
rules regarding their competence aside from the general standard of boni viri. Roebuck and Fumichon 65; 
William W. Buckland, A Manual of Roman Private Law, (2nd ed., 1939) at 384-385; Muirhead, supra note 39 at 
223-225. 
125 See Cicero, On Obligations, transl. by P.G. Walsh (2000) 2.9.33: “Trust reposed in us can be established by 
two qualities, that is, if people come to believe that we have acquired prudence allied with justice... As for men 
of justice, in other words good men [boni viri] trust in them depends on their having no suspicion of deceit and 
injustice in their make-up. So these are the men to whom we believe our safety, our possessions, and our 
children are most justifiably entrusted.” 
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expectation that persons should behave honestly and fairly in legal transactions. Acting 
dishonestly was considered to be against the dictates of good faith (contra bonam fidem). The 
subjective bona fides designated the belief that one’s actions were just and lawful and did not 
violate another’s legitimate interests.126 In certain contexts, the subjective good faith also 
designated the unawareness of a legal shortcoming, such as the good faith purchase of a 
fugitive slave. In the law of property, bona fides had a particular meaning. The person who 
possessed the property of another may, insofar as the general rules of law permitted, acquire 
the ownership of such property by use (usucapio). In such case, bona fides consisted of 
believing that his possession originated in a good title, i.e., the transferor was the owner of the 
transferred property.127  
 
5.4. Fides and bonae fidei iudicia (actions arising from agreements made in good faith) 
 
The transformation of the fides of the bonus vir into the standard of bona fides was a complex 
process influenced by the complex social and economic realities of the late Republic. In 
archaic Rome, the socio-economic exchanges were limited to the narrow Roman community, 
where the status of everybody was clearly defined and their fides-social credit known. With 
the expansion of Roman commercial activities throughout the Mediterranean basin, and the 
increasing influx of foreigners into Rome, economic interactions took place between persons 
who had no knowledge of the other’s creditworthiness. In these circumstances, it is likely that 
commercial practice adopted fides-creditworthiness of the bonus vir as an abstract criterion 
for assessing the obligations of each contractual party.128 The new social and economic 
realities called for legal reforms that would grant legal recognition of the informal relations 
based on fides developed between Romans or between Romans and foreigners. To adapt to 
the new economic and social realities, the number of praetors was increased, and around 242 
BCE the office of peregrine praetor was created to deal with disputes between foreigners and 
citizens. 
The task of reforming the civil law (ius civile) was entrusted to a group of jurisdictional 
magistrates, comprising the praetors, the officers known as curule aediles, and the provincial 
governors. Using their power to formulate legal principles in order to settle a dispute 
(iurisdictio), the praetors created principles, institutions, and remedies that were not based on 
civil law, and which later formed the ius honorarium (“the law laid down by magistrates”). 
The creation of ius honorarium had a double justification. First, because of its rigidity, the ius 
civile was inadequate for the administration of justice among Roman citizens. Second, the ius 
civile was not applicable to legal relations between Romans and foreigners or between 
foreigners.129  
                                                 
126George Mousourakis, The Historical and Institutional Context of Roman Law (2003), 34. 
127 Jolowicz and Nicholas, supra note 10 at 152. Similarly, Levy-Bruhl distinguished two manifestations of the 
legal bona fides. First, there is the social bona fides, introduced by the ex fide bona clause in the bonae fidei 
iudicia to provide legal support for the duty to contract fairly and to prevent further abuses caused by the rigidity 
of ius civile. This manifestation of bona fides requires the contracting parties to act fairly toward each other, as a 
bonus vir or bonus paterfamilias (an upright head of the family) would do. This type of bona fides is devoid of 
any moral content, imposing a reasonable behavior on the contracting parties, not too greedy but also not 
excessively scrupulous. The second manifestation is the moral bona fides, synonym of sincerity (Henri Lévy-
Bruhl, “Book Review of Dalla ‘Fides’ alla ‘Bona Fides’  by Luigi Lombardi”, 39 Revue des Etudes Latines 
(1962) 438, 439. 
128 Roberto Fiori, “Fides et bona fides: Hiérarchie sociale et catégories juridiques” 4 Revue Historique de Droit 
Français et Étranger (2008), 456, 474, C.C. Turpin “Bonae Fidei Iudicia”, 23 Cambridge Law Journal (1965), 
260, 262; Kaser, supra note 56 at 33. 
129 Kaser, supra note 56 at 19. 
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Bonae fidei iudicia are one of the most prominent examples of such praetorian innovations. 
Historians hold controversial views regarding the original purpose of actions of this type. 
Some authors believe that they were created by the peregrine praetor for the commercial 
relations between foreigners or between Romans and foreigners, but other legal historians are 
inclined to believe that such actions were initially created by the urban praetor for relations 
between Roman citizens.130 Using their authority, the praetors created the bonae fidei iudicia 
to litigate relations whose binding character resided not on the written law, but on the 
constraining force of fides as a social, moral, or religious concept. Since they were not based 
on the civil law, bonae fidei iudicia were available also to foreigners.131 Initially part of ius 
honorarium, bona fidei iudicia were introduced into civil law between the end of the 2nd and 
the beginning of the 1st century BCE.132 
The original attestations of this type of action are scarce. The most important references come 
from the writings of Cicero, Gaius, and Justinian. The oldest reference is found in Cicero’s 
On Duties. Cicero mentioned that at the time of Quintus Mucius Scaevola (140-88 BC) the 
bonae fidei iudicia covered five legal relationships: the guardianship (tutela), the fiduciary 
agreement (fiducia), the mandate (mandatum), the purchase and sale (emptio, venditio), and 
the lease and hire (locatio, conductio).133 Gaius’s Institutes, of c. 161 AD, add to the list the 
administration of another’s affairs without authority (negotiorum gestio), the deposit 
(depositum), the partnership (societas), and the action for recovery of a dowry (rei 
uxoriae).134 Finally, Justinian’s Institutes, of 533 AD, extended the list with the actions 
concerning division of property (actiones familiae herciscundae and communi dividundo).135  
These relationships were not marked by a particular emphasis on fides as keeping one’s word, 
but rather on fides as compliance of the dominant party with a traditional standard of behavior 
expected by society in such relations. The exact role played by fides and bona fides in the new 
actions is, however, controversial. On one hand, it has been argued that bonae fidei iudicia 
were aimed at enforcing relations in which fides, as a duty to keep one’s promise existing 
outside of civil law, was invoked as basis of actionability.136 On the other hand, the creation 
of bonae fidei iudicia was regarded as a purely procedural reform, aimed at conferring greater 
freedom on the judge (iudex) by allowing him to determine the amount of the award 
                                                 
130 Many scholars attribute the development of bonae fidei iudicia and other early institutions of the ius gentium 
(“the law of the peoples”) to the judicial activity of the peregrine praetor. Consequently, such actions were 
recognized only subsequent to the creation of the office of peregrine praetor, in 242 BCE (see BéatriceJaluzot, 
La bonne foi dans les contrats: étude comparative de droit français, allemand et japonais (2001) at 26, n. 4; 
Raymond Monier, Manuel Elémentaire de Droit Romain, t.1, (6th ed., 1970), 153, n. 2). Other authors believe 
that these actions were introduced by the urban praetor. According to Wieacker, the fact that the bonae fidei 
iudicia were later considered part of the civil law is more easily explained if these actions had initially been the 
creation of the urban praetor (see Franz Wieacker, “Zum Ursprung der bonae fidei iudicia”, 80 Zeitschrift der 
Savigny-Stiftung fur Rechtsgeschichte (1963), 1; André Magdelain, “Gaius IV, 10 et 33: Naissance de la 
procédure formulaire”, 59 Tijdschrift voor Rechtsgeschiedenis (1991), 239, 248). Watson adopted a similar 
position, arguing that although it is not clear that the obligations based on good faith belonged to the civil law 
from the beginning, the bonae fidei actions were consecrated by the activity of the urban praetor and not by the 
peregrine praetor (Alan Watson, Law Making in the Later Roman Republic (1974), 89-92).    
131 Kaser, supra note 56 at 18-19, 33.  
132 Jaluzot, supra note 130 at 75. 
133 Cicero, On Duties 3.17.70, in Higginbotham, supra note 7 at 46. 
134 Gaius, Institutes 4.62 in Francis de Zulueta (trans.), The Institutes of Gaius (1946). 
135 Justinian, Institutes 4.6.28 in John B. Moyle (trans.), The Institutes of Justinian  (2d ed., 1889) at 182. These 
enumerations do not exhaust the category of bonae fidei iudicia. See Jolowicz and Nicholas, supra note 10 at 
211-212. 
136 Turpin supra note 128 at 262; Kaser, supra note 56 at 19, 33. 
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according to the equity of the case, and not according to the principles of civil law (ex iure 
Quiritium).137  
Turpin argued that a separation between the bonae fidei iudicia, in which fides was originally 
invoked as the ground of obligation, and those in which it was, from the beginning, only the 
measure of the judge’s discretion, may be a false dichotomy. Even in actions in which fides 
was the basis of liability, it must also have influenced the extent of judicial discretion. In a 
claim for an incertum (a promise of something not clearly definable or distinguishable from 
other things of similar kind), the issues of establishing the plaintiff’s liability and ascertaining 
the amount due could not be easily separated. If fides governed the former issue, it could not 
be without relevance to the latter.138 Similarly, Shermaier pointed out that the answer to the 
question whether bona fides was a new source of obligations or merely a tool for the judge to 
assess the standard of performance may lie somewhere between the two hypotheses. Extra-
legal ties based on fides existed before the introduction of the bonae fidei iudicia, and for 
some of these legal remedies were introduced before the said actions. For the social standard 
of fides to become legally relevant, however, it had to be integrated into one of the claims 
protected by a procedural formula. It may be assumed that the role of fides within the formula 
was to create a new source of obligations and to increase the judge’s discretion.139       
The creation of the bonae fidei iudicia represents a central episode in the history of fides as a 
legal concept. Bonae fidei iudicia turned fides into a legal concept by consecrating it as a 
standard of judicial reasoning (the interpretation of facts and the individualization of 
punishment as a bonus vir would have done), and as a source of implicit obligations (the 
obligations that the social fides attached to a relation or position). Nevertheless, breach of 
fides was not treated similarly in all instances of bonae fidei iudicia. In some relations, such 
as purchase and sale (emptio venditio) or lease and hire (locatio conductio), breach of fides 
amounted to breach of an informal, express, or implied promise. In other relations, such as 
guardianship (tutela) or mandate (mandatum), where the traditional fides (confidence reposed 
and creditworthiness enjoyed) found its main manifestations, breach of fides was considered 
particularly heinous and it led to infamy.140  
 
 
6. Fides, bonus vir, and fiduciary relations 
 
The evolution of bona fides continued beyond Roman antiquity, throughout the medieval ius 
commune. During this period, the concept was enriched with numerous legal, ethical, and 
Christian valences, and became an extraordinarily complex, if not undefinable, legal 
institution.141 Although an amorphous notion, good faith evolved to be one of the foundational 
concepts of contemporary private law. At its core, good faith evokes bilateral duties of 
keeping one’s promise, abstaining from deceiving the other party, and abiding by duties that 
can be implied as a matter of fair contractual interpretation.142 Such mutual obligations of 
                                                 
137 Wieacker, for instance, argued that several institutions rooted in the sacral, extra-legal fides, such as 
guardianship (tutela), fiduciary agreement (fiducia), and primitive partnership (societas) were already recognized 
by the civil law and sanctioned by legis actiones at the time the praetor created the bonae fidei iudicia. In the 
case of such relations, the bona fides was invoked in the formula of the new actions created by the praetor not as 
a source of obligations, but only as a means to modernize the existing remedies (Wieacker, supra note 130, 
discussed in Turpin, supra note 130 at 264-265).  
138 Turpin, supra note 130 at 266. 
139 Schermaier, supra note 103 at 74-75. 
140 Jolowicz and Nicholas, supra note 10 at 288. 
141 See James Gordley, “Good faith in contract law in the medieval ius commune” in R. Zimmermann and S. 
Whittaker (eds.), Good Faith in European Contract Law (2000), 93, 116. 
142 Ibid. at 117. 
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good faith exist in fiduciary relations as well, but it is generally agreed that the duty of good 
faith is not a fiduciary duty.143 Bona fides, therefore, is not particularly useful in 
understanding the essence of fiduciary relations and fiduciary duties.           
The concept of bonus vir, however, appears a more promising one. As Section 5.3 above 
shows, the meaning of bonus vir evolved from designating a concrete trustworthy person into 
an abstract standard of judgment that was expected from a person having discretionary power 
over someone else’s interests. The standard of bonus vir resembles closely the standards 
imposed by contemporary law on fiduciaries in two respects. First, considerations of self-
interest are excluded ab initio from the exercise of judgment. As Cicero’s work shows, a 
person is a bonus vir only if he can resist acting in his own interests to another’s detriment.144 
Second, the judgment is based on relevant objective factors as opposed to being guided only 
by the decision-maker’s free will. The resemblance between the two models may be more 
than a mere coincidence. The bonus vir standard appears in several instances in relation to the 
early jurisdiction of the English Court of Chancery. The celebrated American jurist Norton 
Pomeroy described the equitable jurisdiction of early Chancellors as the exercise of a power 
to do justice according to the requirements of the Roman principle arbitrium boni viri.145 
Bonus vir was mentioned also in relation to the use, the forerunner of the trust. Lord Bacon 
defined the use as “the equity and honesty to hold the land in conscientia boni viri,” 146 i.e., 
according to the conscience or judgment of a bonus vir. The work of Lord Stair offers another 
example. Stair described the position of a general mandatary as requiring the exercise of 
discretion as a bonus vir would: “The obligation arising from mandate is chiefly upon the part 
of the mandatar, to perform his undertaking… Where the mandate is not special, it must be 
performed secundum arbitrium boni viri.”147 
The presence of the “judgment of a bonus vir” in the writings of early modern legal scholars 
as a standard of exercise of discretion over another’s interests is remarkable. This concept 
conveys the idea that persons occupying positions of trust and confidence are expected to 
exercise discretion based on relevant factors, excluding considerations of self-interest. The 
same idea lays at the heart of the contemporary law of fiduciary duties.148  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Fiduciary relations are a constantly expanding legal category. The increasing applicability of 
fiduciary duties and the continuing tendency to invoke breach of these duties as an 
instrumental shortcut to alluring legal remedies create a pressing need for conceptual clarity. 
Some scholars look back to the etymological and legal origins of the word “fiduciary,” in 
hope of elucidating the essence of the fiduciary relation. This article traced the origins of fides 
and its evolution in early Roman law. It showed that fides entered the secular law mainly as 
bona fides, which evolved into a cornerstone of contemporary private law applicable across a 
wide range of contractual relations. In contrast, bonus vir, a standard of judgment based on 
                                                 
143 Valsan, supra note 1, 44-47. 
144 Cicero, supra note 125 at 3.19: “If a good man, then, should have this power, that by snapping his fingers his 
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146 Francis Bacon, The Works of Lord Bacon: With an Introductory Essay, vol. 1 (1838) 584. See also Edward 
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fides, appears to be a more promising path for linking the Roman fides with contemporary 
fiduciary duties.    
In ancient Roman society, where the legal sphere was circumscribed by complicated and rigid 
procedures, fides belonged to the realm of “pre-law.”149 The archaic fides was a religious and 
social concept, intimately linked with the idea of subordination and inequality between 
parties. Perceived as a magic virtue, fides was associated with the total and confident 
surrender of one party or nation to another, generating a discretionary, even magic power of 
the dominant party over the weaker one. Under the jurisdiction of the pontiffs, the failure to 
observe the requirements of fides was regarded as a sin that could render the offender sacer, 
exposing him to the wrath of the gods and that of his fellow citizens. Under the censorship, 
breach of fides turned the upright and honest into the evil and disloyal, and attracted 
ignominy, a punishment with severe social consequences. Under the praetorian jurisdiction, 
breach of fides triggered infamy. The infamous could no longer offer his social credit as a 
pledge, and was precluded from postulating and testifying as witness, or from asking for 
witnesses in the praetor’s court.150   
In the pre-classical period, the archaic fides ceased to be a source of actual subordination and 
dominance, and evolved toward a relation of confidence or moral ascendancy. Toward the end 
of the Republic, the relations of power and subordination between politically equal citizens 
were no longer permitted. From that period onward, fides designated primarily confidence 
between equals or between parties voluntarily placed on a footing of inequality. In the late 
Republic, fides-confidence acquired a multitude of meanings, including respect of promise, 
protection, and creditworthiness. Fides-confidence had almost the opposite of the archaic 
connotation of complete abandonment and discretionary domination. The focus of fides 
moved from dominance to protection, from the powers of the dominant party to its duties 
toward the protected one. Despite its importance, fides was not a legal concept as such, in the 
sense of being governed by precise rules and remedies. Toward the end of the Republic, 
bonae fidei iudicia, actions were created for the most important relations based on fides.  
From the perspective of substantive law, fides as confidence reposed and 
trustworthiness remained confined to rules of limited applicability and to particular legal 
institutions. Duties of loyalty and care inspired by the pre-legal fides were consecrated in 
guardianship (tutela), fideicomissary obligation (fideicommissum), fiduciary agreement 
(fiducia), partnership (societas), mandate (mandatum), and possibly the administration of 
another’s affairs without authority (negotiorum gestio). The step of turning these discrete 
legal manifestations of the dictates of fides into a general regime of an abstract fiduciary 
position was never taken. What Roman law knew, therefore, was no more than specific 
fiduciary institutions and offices, each developed and employed in its own circumscribed 
sphere of the law. The metamorphosis of fides, however, did not end when the Dark Ages set 
in. With the rise of Christianity, canon law and ecclesiastic courts, the religious, moral, and 
legal sides of fides, were fused to create a concept of unparalleled complexity.  
From a procedural perspective, however, fides as confidence reposed and trustworthiness 
penetrated  civil law in the form of bonus vir, the archetypal Roman citizen who enjoyed high 
social creditworthiness. Bonus vir evolved from an actual arbitrator to a standard of decision 
making applicable to persons holding discretionary authority over the interests of others. The 
bonus vir standard, requiring absence of self-interest and exercise of discretion based on 
relevant considerations, is the closest that Roman law came to an abstract fiduciary position. 
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